Wallerstein displays a fascinating and insightful image of recent U.S. foreign policy. He explains, in shorter detail than certain readers might desire, how recent U.S. foreign policy differs immensely from the post-World War II and post-1970s U.S. foreign policy. He offers finely-detailed descriptions of the agenda of US presidents since Nixon: they have sought to maintain as much US influence and superiority as possible over the rest of the world. He identifies the immense and determined competitiveness of a few western European economies, namely Germany, alongside East Asia's Japan in the global market system as the forces on the brink of surpassing the U.S. in world domination. Contrary to earlier U.S. foreign policy strategies, foreign policy since early 2001 has used secrecy and unilateralism as its primary style. Hence, the importance of maintaining U.S. influence and superiority has reached a new height in the Bush administration. The Bush supporters, which Wallerstein categorizes as falling in one of three groups, are ensuring that this radically different strategy is incorporated. Wallerstein calls them "machos", "social/political/cultural ideologues", and the "money hungry" type who all are in collusion to see that U.S. superiority continues. He uses the term "hawks" to refer to the present administration's overtly aggressive members. These are the people who are of the belief that if U.S. flexes its muscle, other potential threats (both military and economic) will defer their interests in attaining world domination. From one perspective, this is another example of Wallerstein's quasi-political jargon making its way on the pages; or, perhaps, it is part of his insistence, which he does not effectually articulate, that the intellectuals' criticisms serve to ensure the use of more democratic and egalitarian principles in the political domain.

At moments the reader might be distracted by Wallerstein's insoluble description of what appears to be details about US foreign policy officials and the executive branch of the national government. These descriptions lie very close to the line that separates superficial interpretations from serious criticism because he does not substantiate many of his comments except with more of these comments. His descriptions, one might confirm, are of the type that can only be ascertained through clandestine operations or very friendly encounters with the Bush administration. Or, perhaps, Wallerstein can explain so much of the Bush administration tactics with a behind-the-scenes twist, because more than half of his book consists of his commentaries about the Bush administration published between 2001 and 2004.

Wallerstein presents his work in three parts. The first one is a subtle comparison of the current War on Terror to the last 20 years of the Cold War; the second part is a compilation of his essays written between 2001 and early 2004 covering issues related mostly to the moments preceding and immediately following the invasion of Iraq; in the last section, Wallerstein reminds the reader that it will not be an easy task to fix the problem, and that it will require a concentrated effort to get the U.S. back on track. .

It is obvious that Wallerstein has a prodigious capacity to conceptualize many phenomenological exigencies of the world, past and present. It is even more apparent that he is concerned with the straying of the US national political strategists, especially those of the last 4 years. He offers summary characterizations in personal detail of how presidents and their assistants have asserted US policies and interests in their relations with other countries. .

Wallerstein explains that the problem with current US foreign policy is that its isolationist policies do not complement the economic and political agencies that the U.S. can thoroughly uphold and deliver. If the strengths and weakness of the U.S. were realistically assessed it would be clear that current foreign policy strategies, especially, are contrary to the US interests in the long run. The US economy is not as robust, nor is its industry as pioneering, as it was once before. Wallerstein reminds us that opportunities for the US to economically exploit other nations have been diminishing for decades due to other nations arriving on the scene wishing to do the same. Post-1970s US administrations at first sought to triumph in the competition by obfuscating as much of the problem as they could; this worked. Wallerstein explains, however, that the present administration knowingly yet unwisely is losing reputability that its predecessors secured for the nation. .

Wallerstein is superbly cognizant of the strategies and norms of the present administration, which has used the U.S. military to advance specific foreign policy issues. He engages with the reader, convincingly, about the disproportional and hypocritical blend that characterizes our present foreign policy approaches. In Wallerstein's analysis this problem of hypocrisy and one-sidedness reveals itself most pronouncedly in our administration's response to the nuclear proliferation efforts of certain countries. He explains that since the advent of Germany and Japan's entrance into the quality consumer goods market the U.S. has been overtly partial in its justification of the world nuclear powers. He finds the destructive potential lay not only in the weapons themselves, but in the belief of many US officials that other countries, namely communist and Islamic countries, not pursue nuclear capabilities. .

This work presents various hypotheses (and presumptions) about world affairs. Wallerstein identifies the polity, economy, and military as the 3 axes of influence, endeavor, and elusion, all of which contribute immensely to tensions between countries. The book trains its eye on the distinction between US and Western Europe relations pre-September 11, 2001 and the relationship between these regions post-September 11, 2001. Explanation of the political maneuvers the US has used since its decline in the face of competition from Western Europe and Japan pervades this text in analytical and substantive ways. The text particularly attends to the changes in these political maneuvers since 911 and, more generally, the Bush administration.

For Wallerstein, it is time to "achieve a more democratic and egalitarian world (161)." He doesn't tell us how the world can reach this stage; I do not believe that is his task in this book. Instead I believe that he set out to continue to criticize the current U.S. foreign policy agenda, and to remind his readers of the potential for auspicious change during these volatile stages of geopolitics.

Qaid Hassan, The University of Chicago

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