Tucker's aptly titled philosophical monograph, Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography, says much about the content and contention of his theoretical and methodological proposition. Our Knowledge of the Past alludes to the notion that the limits of our understanding about the past are restricted to the knowledge that we opt to discover or recover via the historical record. Following ideas put forth by Giambattista Vico a few centuries back, Tucker's monograph argues that we can know some aspects of history because history is the creation of humans and its originative principles can be discovered by a reconstructive interpretation of our own historiographical practices. The subtitle of the book, A Philosophy of Historiography, puts forth several propositions and observations that may lead historians to a more rigorous interpretation of historical evidence, theory, and methodology. In short, "as a philosophy of historiography it deals exclusively with philosophical questions that can be elucidated, analyzed, or answered by a rigorous examination of historiography" (pg. 2).

For Tucker, historiography "is composed of representations of past events, usually texts, but other media such as movies or sound recordings may also represent past events." In contrast to typical historiography, however, the author distinguishes between the two by pointing out that scientific historiography is historiography that generates probable knowledge of the past. As such, the book deals with the relationship between historiography and evidence. Tucker believes that this relationship between historiography and evidence, following Rachel Laudan, is "not substantially different from the relations between evidence and theory in biology, geology, or physics" (pg. 8).

He points out this similarity due to the misperception in the past that because historians deal with documents and historical events, their interpretations are value laden and therefore unscientific. Yet, the very process of recovering and interpreting historical data by, say, evolutionary biologists is wholly a historicist enterprise. Thus, the historical narrative of living organisms by paleontologists is a historicist enterprise. Quoting from R.C. Lewontin, "Evolutionary biology…is a historical science. It is the purpose of all these sciences to provide a correct narrative of the sequence of past events and an account of the causal forces and antecedent conditions that led to that sequence" (pg. 85). His philosophy of historiography, therefore, contributes to discussions not only amongst historians and philosophers, but is also relevant for the "everyday practices and concerns of scientists who attempt to obtain knowledge of the past" (pg. 22).

Divided into seven chapters, including an extensive introduction, the author delves into several elements of early and contemporary historiographical debates that continue today in one form or another. Each of these chapters could very well stand alone as individual journal articles; however, they are all brought together by the author's overall efforts of putting forth the possibilities for a more scientific historiography. To paraphrase the author's intention, Tucker first examines where knowledge of history is likely to be present, then how this knowledge emerged historically and how it was obtained and ending with an examination of the limits of historiographic knowledge and the possible reasons for these latter limitations. (pg. 20).

One could well argue that Tucker's book is another contribution to the ongoing "objectivity versus subjectivity" debate. Some might label this as the ongoing battle between Post-modern intellectuals versus those that employ primarily statistical (i.e. scientific) and empirical data. The author describes these alternative positions as "historiographic skepticism" and "historiographic esotericism." Historiographic skepticism believes that there is no knowledge of history and that it is indistinguishable from fiction since it often reflects the biases and cultures of its authors. Historiographic esotericism holds that knowledge of history is possible "but it is impossible to explicitly explain how or why" (pg. 19). Tucker suggests something in the middle of this debate and instead opts to suggest techniques and practices from several other fields that he believes would be conducive to a more rigorous historiographical interpretation.

Tucker is successful in not only outlining the problems within the historiographical tradition that he intends to interrogate, but also in illuminating and then providing various methods to resolve these problems. If we examine Tucker's cross-examination of consensus without coercion, the limits of historiographic knowledge, and his overall intent towards a philosophy of liberation, the arguments made are clear, convincing and substantiated with historical evidence. In particular, I should point out that his comparative analysis between the sciences and historiography are insightful and worthy of further debate, specifically the methods that both of these fields employ to scrutinize and evaluate their evidence.

Having pointed out these significant contributions for the study and knowledge of our past, other questions were invited by this monograph and they are worth discussing at some length here. The primary, and perhaps most considerable question is one that deals with an interrogation of the contemporary social and political context of historical analyses, something that might be called a theory of context. Edward Said pointed this out in his 1979 pioneering study of Orientalism when he observed that "no one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society. These continue to bear upon what he does professionally, even though naturally enough his research and its fruits do attempt to reach a level of relative freedom from the inhibitions and the restrictions of brute, everyday reality." (pg. 10). Granted, this is not new to the field of history; however, it is still something that we have to deal with on an everyday basis.

As a quick observation about this question of our brute everyday realities, Our Knowledge of the Past was not produced in a vacuum. Surely, the final product was influenced and altered by editorial work, workshops, conference discussions, class debates, and late night tequila outings. Moreover, the author is not entering a historiographical void. The public discussion around this issue has been ongoing and he too is cognizant of the debates and issues, and these have therefore framed his own ideas and challenges around those pre-existing issues, and these also impact the final product. As Bruce Lincoln pointed out in Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, "Narrators are not the sole agents in such projects of recalibration: One must also take account of reception. Audiences (and fractions of same) can resist narrative and classificatory innovations; moreover, they are perfectly capable of introducing innovations of their own by selective hearing and reinterpretation. Anticipation of hostile audience responses can also work as a preemptive brake on narrator's willingness to introduce modifications. Ultimately what can be accepted as standard, proper, or hegemonic versions of myth are collective products that have been negotiated between narrators and audiences over time. These form the background against which future narrators craft their interventions and future audiences judge them" (pg. 150).

Having made this latter observation, Tucker too has a "political project" of his own, which is both fruitful and important. In Tucker's conclusion, the author points out the following observation and overall intent of his philosophy of historiography: "…the philosophy of historiography is a philosophy of liberation from the tyranny of the present by means of controlling and limiting knowledge of the past, not to say its outright fabrication." (pg. 262). Any philosophy that deals with the notion of liberation is inspiring to say the least, but here too we get into the question of teleology. As Tucker points out in a very Orwellian observation, "…he who controls what we believe about the past, controls our futures." This political observation warrants serious consideration in general and of historiography in particular, especially since states and governments have traditionally employed history as a legitimizing discourse.

This study should be of interest to a larger audience beyond philosophers, historians, and scientists. If this were a seminar class on the Philosophy of Historiography, other books that might contribute to this very important discussion might be those of Said, Lincoln, Guha, O'Gorman, and Novick. But overall, Tucker's contribution is significant and worthy of a wider reading audience beyond the disciplines mentioned above. Our Knowledge of the Past should provoke some interesting discussions, and this reader plans on keeping this one on his shelf for future reference and for another read.

JoséAngel Hernández, The University of Chicago

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