Dowding, Goodin and Pateman have collected a series of essays in honor of prominent political philosopher Brian Barry, all of which offer perspectives on a question confronted by Barry in his own writings; namely, whether democracy is necessary or even instrumental to the achievement of social justice. The essays represent various viewpoints. While most contributors accept a basic theoretical connection between democracy and justice, all recognize that this connection can be more attenuated in practice. In particular, inadequate safeguards against majoritarianism, institutional complexities, self-interested politicking, and the lack of a singular vision of distributive justice make the articulation of the precise relationship between the two concepts difficult.

The variety of available interpretive frameworks for both justice and democracy make either term difficult to define with precision. The editors confront this issue in their prefatory essay "Between Justice and Democracy" by suggesting some links between the different visions of the two concepts. The authors' theoretical discussion discerns such links in the interests of social and economic groups disadvantaged by majoritarianism, as well as in traditional political philosophical positions such as utilitarianism and contractarianism. In fact, Albert Weale's "Contractarian Theory, Deliberative Democracy and General Agreement" brings this theoretical discussion into sharper focus by elaborating on the contractarian connection between justice and democracy. Weale contends that it seems futile to view social justice as a matter of contract. Since public and political attitudes as to justice tend to change over time, the ideal of atemporal justice cannot be the foundation for any social contract. Weale argues instead that the democratic process should consist in all interested groups convening and deciding on a version of social justice based on a principle of public reasonableness.

Robert Goodin's "Democracy Justice and Impartiality" contends that there is, in fact, a powerful theoretical connection between democracy and justice. Specifically, according to Goodin, impartiality serves as a nexus between broad public participation in politics and distributive justice. Insofar as it means the equal apportionment of power and wealth to each citizen, impartiality is consonant with both the democratic axiom of "one person one vote" as well as with the economic egalitarianism Goodin advocates. Nonetheless, Goodin also recognizes that majoritarianism could impede just allocation of wealth to minorities. In response, Goodin offers general recommendations, which include institutional reform combined with the internalization of justice concerns into democratic decisionmaking.

Keith Dowding also accepts the close connection between justice and democracy, but draws a somewhat different link between the two concepts in his essay entitled "Are Democratic and Just Institutions the Same?" Dowding's main contention is that it is difficult to conceptualize and argue about democracy without involving justice, in either its procedural or substantive form. Focusing on the perennial danger of tyranny of the majority, Dowding observes that minorities that become subject to majority do not always have a legitimate claim for special protection, since their views may be simply too outlandish or unfeasible to be taken seriously by most members of the polity. The legitimacy of minority claims, Dowding argues, is and should be weighed against the prevailing vision of justice embraced by the society in question.

Diametrically opposed to the arguments set forth by Goodin and Dowding, Richard Arneson's provocative thesis states that there is nothing inherently "good" or "just" about democracy. "[I]t is wrong", Arneson writes in "Democracy is not Intrinsically Just," "to hold that each member of a modern society just by being born has a right to an equal say in political power and influence, to equal rights of political citizenship and democratic political institutions." (41). Arneson defends his position by observing that exercise of democratic participation provides individuals with influence over the lives of others, and such influence cannot be granted as of right-it must be granted only to individuals competent to wield it wisely (or perhaps justly). Since democracy is not a priori morally superior to other forms of governance, democratic outcomes are just only insofar as they are so found through ex post empirical observation as to the distributive consequences of democratic decisions.

The issue of disadvantaged minorities in modern democratic systems is considered anew in the essays by Julian Le Grand and Russell Hardin. These authors seem less hostile to the conceptual intermingling of justice and democracy than Arneson, yet their arguments question the validity of certain justice-related objections to some aspects of modern democratic systems. More specifically, Le Grand's "Individual Choice and Social Exclusion" addresses the problem of reduced popular participation in democratic institutions, otherwise known as "social exclusion," and argues that such exclusion is not objectionable when voluntary. Hardin qualifies this claim by observing in "Subnational Groups and Globalization" that certain ethnocultural minorities' desire to shield themselves from outside influences may not be objectionable per se; however, it should be state-sponsored only in limited circumstances.

Norman Schofield's essay "'The probability of a fit choice': American Political History and Voting Theory" takes on the deliberative strain of democratic theory, and specifically the claim that democratic deliberation tends to reconcile opposing political viewpoints. Schofield's formal presentation relies on historical data from American political history to show that democratically elected leaders may in fact gain more popular support by deepening ideological rifts than by trying to bridge the distance between their opponents' views and their own. Jon Elster paints a more optimistic picture in "Mimicking Impartiality," arguing that proper institutional design, combined with the operation of social norms, may induce leaders and their constituents to be more impartial and accommodating in practice, even if their true motives or the strength of their political position point in more self-interested directions.

Ultimately, social justice in a democracy amounts to a collective decision as to who gets how much and when. In the case of public goods, by definition non-rival and non-excludable, all social groups can partake according to need. Yet, as David Miller observes in "Justice, Democracy and Public Goods," this does not answer the first-order question of which goods society will choose to make public. After all, certain groups may benefit more from certain public goods than others. By way of illustration, Miller notes that even if athletic facilities are made available to everyone, they will be valued more by some than others. In this sense, public goods are subject to the same kinds of justice considerations as any other type of social wealth. Miller posits that democracy may be more adept that other forms of government in taking such justice considerations into account, since it allows for broader group input as to which goods need to be made public.

Failed attempts to fit concerns for social justice in a political system that is often plagued by powerful factional interests may breed mistrust towards democracy. Philip Pettit's discussion in "The Common Good" provides an appropriate rejoinder. According to Pettit, democracy would become more just if citizens became more public-spirited in making collective decisions. In other words, democratic outcomes should not be aggregates of individual and often self-serving interests, but the results of deliberation confined to the common good; i.e. to matters that "by publicly admissible criteria answer better…to publicly admissible considerations." (169). Although Pettit's account does not fully explain precisely how public debate will be so confined, it still reflects the hope that, for all its shortcomings, democracy can promote the good life.

In our time, democracy is being propounded as a mode of government worth establishing and expanding. The essays in Justice and Democracy, however, raise legitimate and thought-provoking questions regarding the ability of democratic institutions to treat all social groups fairly, to allow all citizens to pursue their notion of happiness, and to distribute society's wealth in an even-handed manner. In all, those interested in insightful and sometimes critical perspectives on modern democracy's potential to promote a liberal vision of justice will find this volume quite rewarding.

Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, The University of Chicago

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