This anthology draws on a diverse and wide-ranging series of contributions in order to present a novel and ambitious outlook on practical conflict. In doing so, the editors argue in favor of a dialogue between practical philosophy and social science. They seek to combine philosophical perspectives on self-determination with the empirical conclusions of psychology and rational choice theory concerning the conditions of agency.

With that larger aim in the background, the volume focuses specifically on agency-conflict, leaving the interpersonal dimension of conflict aside. This choice relies on the intuition that agency-conflict offers a particularly significant and well-defined issue from which to address the status and scope of practical reason, both at the empirical and theoretical level. Agency-conflict seems to imply a limit to the coherence of reason itself. As such, it poses a critical challenge to the systematic and rational explanation of individual behaviour that goes well beyond the concrete conditions from which these conflicts arise.

The dialogue is left extraordinarily open-ended. No common definition, field, or theoretical standpoint is set. Yet, despite the diversity of the research, this collection does pose a central question: do philosophical conceptions of practical reason shed light on our experience of conflict, or are the quandaries of concrete decision-making and the operational realities of agency too complex for any systematic model of reason to capture?

The various essays are probably best organized according to the level at which they respond to this common question.

• A first series of purely theoretical essays consider whether philosophical conceptions of practical reason actually allow for any non-trivial understanding of the notion of conflict.
• A second series take the question from the opposite end, exploring how far and under what conditions conflict can be rationally resolved. These essays focus on a common object: the problem of incomparability.
• Lastly, a number of essays reflect on the relation between reason and conflict and try to show, from a variety of viewpoints, how these notions help define one another.

Let us begin with the purely theoretical essays. These essays refer to two fundamental conceptions of practical reason: Kantian moral formalism and empirically-inspired moral naturalism. Though limited, this selection is sufficient since these are arguably the most relevant positions in the theoretical debate.

The argument for a roughly Kantian position is made powerfully by David Velleman, who defends the significance of the notion of conflict for formalist moral thought. In order to do so, he revises an argument by Korsgaard on the constitution of moral identity and the eligibility of practical reasons. Korsgaard's argument is of great significance, as it is typical of a "strong" version of Kantian philosophy which can be traced most notably to Karl-Otto Apel.

As Velleman points out, this "strong" position answers a number of objections regarding the motivational power of formal reasons, but it does so at a cost. One of those costs is the exclusion of the notion of conflict from the sphere of practical reason. Velleman proposes instead a "concessive" version of Kant's theory of volition, which places choice, and therefore conflict, at the heart of the relation between self-determination and moral destination.

Christine Korsgaard follows up this defense of Kantianism with an attack on the deliberative realism of the naturalist position. She argues that the naturalistic conception of practical reason is less receptive to deliberative conflict than formalist theories of volition, notably where conflicts of principle are involved. Paradoxically, naturalism seems most at risk of losing any significant notion of conflict.

As can be seen, the debate is presented from a single standpoint, wherein the notion of conflict serves mainly to shift the burden of proof, by reinforcing the plausibility of the formalist position at the expense of the naturalist one. This doesn't necessarily indicate a bias, nor does it weaken the theoretical import of the collection. Instead it may well highlight the fact that moral naturalism largely neglects issues of deliberative conflict and its relation to practical reason, leaving such questions to the sphere of applied agency and empirical research.

The second broad issue the collection addresses is that of incomparability. Incomparability poses a particularly salient problem for action theory in that it implies that the basis for rational decision, and therefore the scope of reason itself, is limited. This problem arises both at the normative level, where incommensurability of values seems to justify irredeemable axiological pluralism, and the empirical level, where incomparability of preferences and outcomes underdetermine rational choice. The solutions developed focus on the structure and mechanisms of decision, from the perspective of theories of rational choice or theories of value

From the rational choice perspective, Isaac Levi draws on the resources of cardinal utility theory to extend the commensurability of conflicting options, and thus solve a series of dilemmas of rational choice. This approach requires a loosening of the basis of rational decision from the stringent condition of "optimality" to a wider criterion of "admissibility". Levi argues that doing so may allow for the passage from a stalemate of undefeated reasons to all-things-considered solutions. He even carries over his argument to normative questions, offering an alternative justification of the maximin principle.

From the value theory perspective, Ruth Chang develops a similar solution. She contends that the rational resolution of conflicts of value can be reconciled with plurality of choice in a context where values are conceived of as divisible notions. Thus, conflicting orders of value can always be integrated under a broader axiological horizon, where their relation is configured and the agent finds a coherent context of decision. For Chang, such "third terms" can only be more comprehensive covering values, which generally remain nameless.

However, even if the problem of incomparability can be rationally resolved, important theoretical differences subsist between these two approaches, notably concerning the structure of decision, as Richardson points out.

The last series of essays offers no direct answer to the collection's central question, but points to the resilience and fecundity of the relation between reason and conflict at all levels of research. Conflict and reason respond to one another, from the framing of the philosophical question of practical reason (Baumann) to the analysis of the complexities of concrete conflicts (Elster). Most interestingly perhaps, Joseph Raz and Monika Betzler use the residual notion of regret as a means to explore conflict and self-determination. For Betzler in particular, regret tells us something more about the concrete position of the agent and the stability of his practical identity and project than what abstract rationality alone could capture.

In fine, the study of conflict brings out another essential theme of practical reason: the problematic but irreducible place of freedom in individual action. The importance of this issue is probably best evidenced by the concern of many of the volume's contributors to introduce indeterminacy into the mechanisms of rational decision. Velleman, Chang, Mele, White, and Guckes all touch on this subject, but Elster leaves this aspect of practical conflict aside. This is a pity, considering his previous work on the topic.

Unsurprisingly, the strengths and relative weaknesses of this collection tend to reflect the open-ended and free-form nature of the dialogue it seeks to establish. The diversity of approach and progressive development of the core question through a mosaic of overlapping concerns make it a broad and somewhat demanding read. However, this versatility suits the heuristic character of this work and the wealth of the subject, making it worthwhile for readers with an interest in relating philosophy and social science.

Contributions by: J. David Velleman, Christine M. Korsgaard, Henry S. Richardson, Ruth Chang, Isaac Levi, Joseph Raz, Monika Betzler, Nicholas White, Peter Baumann, Alfred R. Mele, Peter Schaber, Jon Elster, Barbara Guckes.

Neil Martin, The University of Chicago

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